Now that it’s done—illegally—we have to hope that the US takeover of Venezuela works.
By “works” I mean, at the minimum, the following:
Sovereignty, stability and a decent, functioning, democratic government is restored (after many years of Maduro’s dictatorship and thuggery) to the people of Venezuela.
The United States facilitates this restoration quickly, and in a manner that is recognized as responsible and fair. No more crazy claims of the US “running” Venezuela.
Venezuela’s abundant natural resources are not stolen by the US government working with private American corporations, but instead are recognized as lawfully belonging to the people of Venezuela and developed in partnership with the legitimate government of the country.
I won’t hold my breath.
And after a weekend of various officials—most notably, President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio—offering a profusion of contradictory, evasive and fanciful answers to questions from reporters, it is clear there is no real plan here. Even “concepts of a plan,” overstates things. Trump is bloviating, gesturing at the very real problems that have already emerged in this latest American adventure in South America.
For weeks leading up to the US attack on Venezeula, I’d ask government officials and others in a place to know what the Trump administration’s plan was. The answer was always the same: There is no plan. So here we are.
And then there was Secretary Rubio; he was not reassuring. If you saw Rubio’s appearances on the Sunday shows, you saw a man sneering and spitting at reporters’ legitimate questions about all these matters. That’s a tell. Sneering and spitting contempt at reporters is, of course, a hallmark of Trumpist governance. It stems from their overblown self-regard and sheer ignorance of the substantive issues.
But Marco Rubio knows better. I got the very distinct impression he was being defensive, refusing to answer simple questions with any substantive explanations because…they don’t have any answers. Listening to him on those shows, and watching Trump hold forth on Air Force One, a terrible thought came to me:
The shit-show has already begun.
So, a few basic questions are in order:
What is the U.S. objective: regime change, resource control, or something else?The president is talking about being “in charge” and needing “total access” to oil; Rubio is describing leverage and “running policy.” Which one is the mission statement?
What is the operational definition of success—and the trigger for “boots on the ground”?List the threshold conditions for the American military to intervene in a post-Maduro Venezuela. Threats to U.S. forces? Attacks on oil facilities—how will they be secured? Mass violence? Regime collapse? Civil conflict among rivals for power? Gang violence?
Who does the U.S. recognize as the legitimate governing authority today—Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, the opposition’s elected mandate, or “whoever cooperates”?If it’s conditional, what are the specific, written conditions, and what is the enforcement mechanism the US will employ to assure they are achieved?
Who is actually in charge on our side—on paper, and in practice? Trump literally waved at “the people that are standing right behind me,” when asked how the US will actually administer Venezuela—”run it,” as he said. There were three people there—Rubio, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Dan Caine. Venezuela is a nation of 30 million people roughly the size of the US east of the Mississippi River. The staff of the National Security Council under Trump has been gutted; key State Department posts are unfilled. So what is the actual command structure for vast tasks of diplomacy, intelligence, sanctions, military posture, reconstruction planning, and communications?
What does “we’re in charge” mean operationally if there are no U.S. troops on the ground? This is critical. We are going to learn very quickly that—when it comes to taking over a country—press conferences on Air Force One don’t mean diddly-squat. So: What concrete levers (beyond the naval “quarantine”) constitute “control,” and how does the administration measure whether it’s real control or just rhetoric?
Why empower Maduro’s corrupt and vicious inner circle rather than the opposition—who actually won an election? The U.S. recognizes the opposition’s 2024 victory in Venezuela’s presidential election. So how does sidelining those leaders advance “democracy,” legitimacy, and stability rather than just recreating another strongman regime under U.S. pressure? And what if the majority of Venezuelans, who courageously voted for the party of Nobel Peace Prize winner Marina Corina Machado and Edmundo González, reject Trump’s hand-picked lackeys?
What is the end-state—and the timetable?What does “bring the country back and then have elections” mean in weeks and months, not slogans? And what conditions must be met before elections happen?
What is the plan to prevent a security vacuum and insurgency?Venezuela has some of the most heavily armed and violent gangs and private militias in the world. If these armed colectivos, and the criminal networks, and militias are active, what is the strategy to deter revenge killings, protect civilians, and prevent factional violence—without a sustained US military occupation?
What is the realistic oil timeline—and who bears the risk?If restoring Venezuela’s oil production will—as industry experts say—take years and massive capital investments, what happens in the meantime?
What is the economic cost to U.S. taxpayers and consumers?What are the projected costs of sustained naval deployment, potential follow-on operations, intelligence posture, humanitarian aid, and possible reconstruction—and where is that money coming from? Specifically?
—Terry